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ABSTRACT
Securing access to data in location-based services and mobile ap-
plications requires the definition of spatially aware access control
systems. Even if some approaches have already been proposed
either in the context of geographic database systems or context-
aware applications, a comprehensive framework, general and flexi-
ble enough to cope with spatial aspects in real mobile applications,
is still missing. In this paper, we make one step towards this di-
rection and we present GEO-RBAC, an extension of the RBAC
model to deal with spatial and location-based information. In GEO-
RBAC, spatial entities are used to model objects, user positions,
and geographically bounded roles. Roles are activated based on the
position of the user. Besides a physical position, obtained from a
given mobile terminal or a cellular phone, users are also assigned
a logical and device independent position, representing the feature
(the road, the town, the region) in which they are located. To make
the model more flexible and re-usable, we also introduce the con-
cept of role schema, specifying the name of the role as well as the
type of the role spatial boundary and the granularity of the logi-
cal position. We then extend GEO-RBAC to cope with hierarchies,
modeling permission, user, and activation inheritance.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—Spatial
Databases and GIS; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and In-
formation Systems]: Security and Protection
General Terms
Management, Security, Theory
Keywords
GIS, Authorization model, Access control, Location-based services
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1. INTRODUCTION
The widespread deployment of location-based services and mo-
bile applications as well as the increased concern for the manage-
ment and sharing of geographical information in strategic appli-
cations like environmental protection and homeland security have
resulted in a strong demand for spatially aware access control sys-
tems. These application domains pose interesting requirements
against access control systems. In particular, the permissions as-
signed to users depend on their position in a reference space; users
often belong to well defined categories; objects to which permis-
sions must be granted are located in that space; access control poli-
cies must grant permissions based on object locations and user po-
sitions.
As an example, consider an information service providing real
time traffic information to car drivers. Suppose that the set of users
includes different categories of drivers, such as tourists, taxi drivers
and police. Each category of drivers needs to access different in-
formation resources. For example taxi drivers should be allowed to
get detailed traffic information about roads as well as notification
about the position of possible traffic jams or accidents occurred
along roads. Both traffic and jam information refer to well defined
locations in the reference space. In this context, we may need to
specify for example that a taxi driver could be allowed to notify ac-
cidents only when driving along some major roads within the city
and only about accidents that have occurred within given distance
from the his/her position.
To deal with the requirements listed above, an access control
model with spatial capabilities is needed. Since in location-aware
applications users are often grouped in distinct categories (tourists,
taxi drivers and police in the previous example) role-based access
control models (RBAC models) [9, 17] represent a reasonable
choice. Various role-based and spatially aware access control sys-
tems have been proposed for securing access to spatial data stored
in a spatial DBMS or for securing access to location-aware applica-
tions [6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16]. Even though some preliminary proposals
have been reported adding contextual information, such as spatial
and temporal information to access control mechanisms, such ap-
proaches are simplistic and do not account for several of the re-
quirements we have devised such as multigranularity of position
and relationships in space.
In this paper, we overcome those limitations by proposing a com-
prehensive spatial framework for an access control system securing
access to spatial data in location-aware applications. Such a model,
called GEO-RBAC, is an extension of the RBAC model with the
concept of spatial role and supports the homogeneous representa-
tion of all spatial aspects involving roles, objects and contextual
information such as user position. The spatial model we adopt is
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compliant with OGC (Open GeoSpatial Consortium) [12]. Thus,
it is based on the notion of feature type (a road, a town, a region)
and feature, as instance of a given feature type (road A10, Milan,
Lombardy). Features have a well defined geometry (representing
points, lines, or polygons) in a reference space. Objects in GEO-
RBAC correspond to sets of features of a given type.
A spatial role in GEO-RBAC represents a geographically bound-
ed organizational function. The boundary can be defined as a fea-
ture, such as a road or a city. For example, a spatial role may spec-
ify that role taxi driver is defined for Milan or for Genoa. Roles are
activated based on the position of the user. Besides a physical po-
sition, obtained from a given mobile terminal such as a GPS based
vehicle tracking device or a cellular phone, users are also assigned a
logical and device independent position, representing the feature in
which the user is located. Logical positions can be computed from
real ones by using specific mapping functions. To make the model
more flexible, we assume that logical positions can be represented
at different granularities, depending on the spatial role played by
the user. To specify the type of the spatial boundary of the role and
the granularity of the logical position, we introduce the concept of
spatial role schema. Spatial roles are thus specified as instances
of role schemas. The usage of role schemas and instances makes
GEO-RBAC quite flexible since the type of role extents and logical
positions can be customized (and the definition re-used), depending
on the function the role represents. In conclusion, the main contri-
butions of the paper are twofold: the proposal of a comprehensive
framework for dealing with the spatial content of an access control
system; the extension of the RBAC framework with the concept of
role schema/instance, thus of a meta-level for roles that, if properly
adapted, can be applied beyond the spatial context.
In this paper, we first present GEO-RBAC as an extension of
the flat RBAC model. Then, we discuss how GEO-RBAC can be
extended to deal with hierarchies. More precisely, the paper is or-
ganized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work. The ref-
erence geometric model we consider in this paper and its usage in
GEO-RBAC are introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we present
the core model of GEO-RBAC whereas hierarchies are discussed
in Section 5. An overall example is then presented in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 presents some concluding remarks and outlines
future work.
2. RELATED WORK
In GIS (Geographical Information Systems) research area, the
demand for spatially aware access control systems is primarily mo-
tivated by the increased concern for geographical information shar-
ing. To our knowledge, the first access control model for geograph-
ical data has been proposed in [1, 4] and only deals with satellite
image maps. On the other hand, an access control system for geo-
metric and vector-based spatial data has been proposed in [3]. The
model introduces the concept of spatial authorization as an autho-
rization that can be defined only on portions of space. When an
access request is made for an object, the system checks whether
the requested object lies in the authorization space and if this is the
case, it grants the access. This model has been applied to support
controlled access to spatial data on Web. The underlying spatial
data model is, however, relatively simple and does not address im-
portant issues such as the multigranularity of spatial data. A simi-
lar architecture, but focused on XML-based representation of spa-
tial data, has been proposed in [15]. A more complex spatial data
model has been assumed in [2]. In this work, an access control sys-
tem is presented that allows the specification of authorization rules
to access complex structured spatial data stored in a DBMS and
organized according to multiple spatial representation levels and at
multiple granularities. The system, however, does not deal with
geographically bounded roles neither with mobile users.
The position of users is considered in access control models se-
curing mobile and context-aware applications. In [10, 11], an ex-
tension of RBAC is proposed based on the notion of spatial role,
intended as a role that is automatically activated when the user is
in a given position. The space model is however very simple and
targeted to wireless network applications. It consists of a set of ad-
jacent cells and the position of the user is the cell or the aggregate
of cells containing it. The spatial granularity of the position is thus
fixed while the space is rigidly structured and the position itself
does not have any semantic meaning but simply a geometric value.
By contrast, in our model the granularity of the user position may
depend on the role of the user; thus no assumption is made on the
space layout. Moreover, the spatial dimension integrates geometric
and semantic knowledge about the world.
User position can be considered as a state variable in access con-
trol systems based on the notion of context [6, 7, 8, 16]. Of par-
ticular interest is the access control system proposed in [6, 7], in-
troducing the concept of environment roles. Roles can be activated
based on the value of conditions in the environment where the re-
quest has been made. Environmental conditions include time, lo-
cation, and other contextual information that is relevant to access
control. If compared with GEO-RBAC, the concepts of role extent
and user position are close to that of context variables. However,
the mechanism of contexts is very general and does not account for
the specificity of spatial information, such as the multi-granularity
of position and the spatial relationships that may exist between the
spatial elements in space. Moreover, in GEO-RBAC a common
spatial data model is adopted in order to provide a uniform and
standard based representation of locational aspects that, notably,
involve not only roles but also protected objects.
3. SPATIAL INFORMATION IN GEO-RBAC
In order to make RBAC spatially aware, we need to first in-
troduce the reference geometric model we want to use. In GEO-
RBAC, the geometric model is used to represent objects, to model
user positions, and to assign spatial extents to roles.
3.1 The reference geometric model
The geometric model describes how locations on Earth are rep-
resented in GEO-RBAC. We assume objects to be embedded in the
Euclidean space E whilst a spatial reference system maps locations
in E onto places on Earth. We assume objects to have a geometric
representation (geometry) compliant with the OGC (Open GeoSpa-
tial Consortium) simple feature geometric model [12]. We adopt
this model because it is widely deployed in commercial spatial
DBMSs and GISs. Although a more advanced spatial data model
has been recently proposed [13, 14], we do not loose in generality
by adopting the simple feature model.
In such a model, the geometry of an object can be of type point,
line or polygon, or recursively be a collection of disjoint geome-
tries. A point describes a single location in the coordinate space;
a line represents a linear interpolation of an ordered sequence of
points; a polygon is defined as an ordered sequence of closed lines
defining the exterior and interior boundaries of an area. An interior
boundary defines a hole in the polygon.
In GEO-RBAC, we consider the set of all geometries contained
in a reference space (a polygon) and we denote it with GEO. We
denote with MBB the reference space.
Geometries can be related by different types of relationship.
Among them, the reference set of topological relations is {Dis-
joint, T ouch, In,Contains,Equal, Cross,Overlap}. These
30
relations are binary, mutually exclusive (if one is true, the others
are false) and they are a refinement of the well-known set of topo-
logical relations proposed by Clementini et al. in [5]. To exemplify,
theContains(x, y) relationship between geometries x and y holds
when all points of y are also points of x.
3.2 Spatially aware objects
We assume that resources to be protected consist of data about
entities of the real world that may occupy a position. To be compli-
ant with the OGC terminology, we call these entities features [12].
Features are identified by names. Milan, lake Michigan, car
identified by AZ213JW are examples of features. Features are
spatial when entities can be mapped onto locations in the given
space (for example, Milan and lake Michigan). The location of
a feature is represented through a geometry. Conversely, features
are non-spatial when they are not associated with any location (for
example car identified by AZ213JW ). The sets of spatial features
and non-spatial features are denoted in the following respectively
by Fs and Fns with Fs ∩ Fns = Ø. We define the set of features
F = Fs ∪ Fns. Feature location is formally defined as follows.
DEFINITION 1 (FEATURE LOCATION). LetF be the set of fea-
tures and GEO be the set of geometries in space E. Feature loca-
tion is a function LocObj : F → GEO ∪ {⊥}. Given a feature
f ∈ F , the location LocObj(f) is either a geometry in GEO if
f ∈ Fs or undefined (⊥) if f ∈ Fns. We assume that the dimen-
sion of a feature f , denoted by dim(f), is the geometric type of its
location: 0 if it is a point, 1 if it is a line, 2 if it is a polygon, and ⊥
if f ∈ Fns.
Features have an application dependent semantics that is express-
ed through the concept of feature type [12]. A feature type captures
the intensional meaning of the entity. Road, Town, Lake, Car
are examples of feature types. The extension of a feature type ft,
denoted by ext(ft), is a set of semantically homogeneous features.
We assume, without loosing in generality, that the dimension of a
spatial feature type is the dimension of its instances. For example,
Road may have dimension 1 whereas Town and Lake may have
dimension 2. A feature type is instead non-spatial when the ex-
tension only includes non-spatial features (for example, Car). The
two sets of spatial feature types and non-spatial feature types are in-
dicated respectively by FTs and FTns with FTs∩FTns = Ø. We
define the set of features types FT = FTs∪FTns. Next definition
introduces some functions relevant for feature management.
DEFINITION 2 (FEATURES FUNCTIONS). Let FT = {ft1,
. . . , ftn} be the set of feature types, F andGEO the set of features
and geometries, respectively. We define:
• FT dim : FT → {0, 1, 2,⊥} such that, given a feature
type ft, FT dim(ft) = 0 if ft is of type point, FT dim(ft)
= 1 if ft is of type line, FT dim(ft) = 2 if ft is of type
polygon, FT dim(ft) = ⊥ when ft ∈ FTns.
• Ext : FT → 2F , the mapping from a feature type, either
spatial or non-spatial, to a subset of features such that, given
fti ∈ FT , ∀f ∈ Ext(fti), dim(f) = FT dim(fti).
Given a feature type fti, Ext(fti) represents the extension of
fti.
• FT Type : F → FT the mapping from a feature to its
feature type.
In some application contexts, it may happen that some spatial re-
lationship exists between feature type extensions, defining a partial
order between feature types. Consider for example feature types
Region and Town. It is reasonable to assume that the geometry
associated with instances of Town is contained in the geometry of
instances of Region. As we will see, such relationship will be use-
ful in characterizing the relationships between locations and role
extents.
DEFINITION 3 (FEATURE TYPE CONTAINMENT). Let fti
∈ FT, ftj ∈ FT, i 
= j. We say that fti is contained in ftj ,
denoted by fti ⊆ft ftj , if ∀fi ∈ Ext(fti) ∃fj ∈ Ext(ftj) such
that LocObj(fi) ⊆ LocObj(fj).
In order to more easily assign permissions, we assume that ob-
jects in GEO-RBAC are represented as subsets of feature type ex-
tensions. Formally, objects are defined as follows.
DEFINITION 4 (OBJECTS IN GEO-RBAC). Let FT the set
of feature types. Objects in GEO-RBAC are defined as OBJ =
S
ft∈FT 2
Ext(ft)
. Thus, the set OBJ consists of all possible sub-
sets of feature type extensions.
Objects in GEO-RBAC can be extensionally represented by list-
ing the features belonging to the set or by intensionally specifying
a query either spatial or non-spatial over a feature type extension.
The object in this case corresponds to the query result.
3.3 Spatial role
The central notion in GEO-RBAC is that of spatial role defined
as a pair < r, e >, where r is the role name and e the spatial extent
(extent for short) of the role. The role extent defines the boundaries
of the space in which the role can be assumed by the user.
Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the extent of a role,
besides a geometry, has a semantic characterization. Thus, we as-
sume role extents to be modelled as features of possibly different
feature types. As a further consideration, note that in real applica-
tions it makes sense to have also non-spatial roles. For example, it
does not seem reasonable to assign spatial extents to roles related
to company organizations such as Manager or Employee. How-
ever, for the sake of uniformity, we consider non-spatial roles to be
a subset of spatial roles having the reference space, i.e. MBB, as
role extent.
DEFINITION 5 (ROLE EXTENT). LetR be a set of role names,
let REXT FT ⊆ FT be the set of role extent feature types. The
set of role extents, denoted by REXT , is defined as REXT =
S
ft∈REXT FT Ext(ft) ∪ {MBB}.
Notice that the same role name can appear in different spatial
roles. For example the role Driver can be associated with different
extents, say the city of Milan or Rome, to form distinct spatial roles.
3.4 Position Model
In GEO-RBAC, we assume users to have a position that can
change in time. Positions can be real or logical. The real position
corresponds to the position on the Earth of the user, obtained from a
given mobile terminal such as a GPS based vehicle tracking device
or a cellular phone. Real positions can be represented as geome-
tries of different types since, depending on the chosen technology
and accuracy requirements, they may correspond to points or poly-
gons. For the sake of generality we do not make any assumption on
the geometric type of the real position.
Besides real positions, however, for activating a given role, it
may be useful to know not only the real position of the user but
also the logical one. The logical position allows a position to be
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represented in a way that is almost independent from the underly-
ing positioning technology. Logical position is modelled as a spa-
tial feature. For example the logical location of a vehicle may be
a polygonal feature of type, say, city. Such a feature can already
exist in the information base or be a new feature entered into the
system when the position is notified. Positions can also be repre-
sented at varying granularity levels which may depend on the role
played by the user: for example for a taxi driver the logical posi-
tion can be a point along a road while for a truck driver it may be
a portion of road. Note that a coarse position may be requested for
privacy-preserving purpose, in order to hide the actual position of
user.
The logical position can be computed from real positions by us-
ing specific mapping functions.
For example, a function could be defined to map a point acquired
through GPS based equipment onto the closer road segment.
DEFINITION 6 (POSITIONS). The setRPOS of real positions
is a subset of geometries in GEO, thus RPOS ⊆ GEO. The set
LPOS of logical positions consists of features of type in
LPOS FT ⊆ FT , thus LPOS is defined as
LPOS =
S
ft∈LPOS FT Ext(ft).
Given a feature type ft, we call position mapping function for
ft a function mft defined as mft : RPOS → LPOS such that
mft(rp) = f and f ∈ Ext(ft). The function mft, given a real
position rp, returns a logical position corresponding to an instance
of ft having rp as real position.
A position mapping function is a total function, thus the logi-
cal position can be computed for any real position. Moreover, we
assume to have at least one position mapping function for each fea-
ture type ft. We denote with M the set of all position mapping
functions.
Notation Meaning
FT Feature types
F Features
R Role names
REXT FT Feature types of role extents
LPOS FT Feature types of logical positions
REXT Role extents
LPOS Logical positions
RPOS Real positions
M Position mapping functions
OBJ Objects
Table 1: Notation for the main sets used in GEO-RBAC
4. THE GEO-RBAC CORE MODEL
The central idea of GEO-RBAC is the distinction between the
concept of role schema and role instance (or spatial role). A role
schema defines some common properties of a set of spatially aware
organizational functions with a similar meaning. A role schema
not only defines a common name for a set of spatial roles but also
constrains the space where roles can be enabled. Moreover it spec-
ifies the type of logical locations and ultimately the granularity of
the position that the users playing that role may occupy. A role
instance is a role fulfilling the constraints defined at schema level.
A spatial role has thus the same name of the schema role name
whereas the spatial boundary of the role is a spatial feature with a
precise semantics. It should be noticed that all spatial roles instan-
tiating a role schema are fully identified by the role extent (feature)
name. Another important property of the role schema is that it may
be assigned permissions. Those permissions are then inherited and
shared by all the instances of the role schema.
Users are assigned spatial roles, thus instances of some role sche-
ma that can be activated during a session. Unlike RBAC, roles are
enabled only when the user position is contained in the role extent.
For sake of readability, in what follows we present the model as
organized in a number of logical parts, one for each major set of
the RBAC model, i.e. roles, permissions, users, sessions. The gen-
eral structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. We use the
graphical representation adopted in RBAC. In defining the model,
we refer to the notation introduced in the previous section and sum-
marized in Table 1.
4.1 Role schemas and instances
A role schema defines a common name for a set of roles, the
feature type of the role extent, the feature type of the logical loca-
tions and the mapping function relating real positions with logical
positions.
DEFINITION 7 (ROLE SCHEMA). A Role Schema is a tuple
< r, ext, loc,mloc > where:
• r ∈ R;
• ext ∈ REXT FT ;
• loc ∈ LPOS FT ;
• loc ⊆ft ext;
• mloc ∈ M is a location mapping function for feature type
loc.
We denote with RS the set of role schemas and we assume that,
given a role name r ∈ R, r is unique in RS .
An example of role schema is the tuple < TaxiDriver,Road-
Network, PointOnRoad,mPointOnRoad > in which: Taxi-
Driver is the name of the role; RoadNetwork the feature type
of the role extent, thus the “kind of object” that spatially constrains
the role; PointOnRoad the feature type of logical positions con-
sisting of points along road lines; finally mPointOnRoad the posi-
tion mapping function that maps a real position into a logical one.
Such a function might compute the point on road closer to the real
position of the user.
From Definition 7 it follows that the feature type representing
the logical location must precede in the ordering the feature type
representing the role extent. According to Definition 3, this means
that logical positions must be contained in role extents. Thus, it
cannot occur that a location only partially overlaps the space de-
fined by the role extent. In the above example, the feature type
PointOnRoad precedes RoadNetwork since we assume all in-
tances of PointOnRoad are points contained in the lines repre-
senting roads. From this assumption it follows that it is always
possible to determine whether the logical location of a user is con-
tained in a role extent and thus which roles in the session are en-
abled.
Based on the previous definition, the role schema for a role name
r is unique. This means that different schemas for the same role,
such as: < TaxiDriver,RoadNetwork, loc,mloc > and
< TaxiDriver,Region, loc1,mloc1 > are not allowed. Should
the application require a role on different types of extents, a hierar-
chy of role schemas has to be defined (see Section 5).
Given a role schema, role instances can be simply created by
specifying for the role name its extent as a feature of the type spec-
ified in the schema.
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Figure 1: Core GEO-RBAC
Notice that of the four components of a role schema, only the first
two are actually needed for the specification of a role instance. As
we will see, the last two components, involving the notion of logical
position, are needed for role activation. To indicate the component
α of role schema rs, we use the notation rs.α.
DEFINITION 8 (ROLE INSTANCE). Given a role schema rs,
an instance ri of rs is a pair < r, e > where r = rs.r and e ∈ F ,
such that FT Type(e) = rs.ext. The schema of ri is denoted by
SchemaOf(ri).
We denote withRI ⊆ R×REXT the set of role instances for all
role schemas. For the sake of readability, a role instance < r, e >
is also denoted by r(e).
4.2 Permissions
In GEO-RBAC, permissions can be associated either with the
role schema and inherited by all role instances of the schema or di-
rectly with role instances. Such different granularities are formal-
ized by introducing two functions: S PrmsAssignment, relating
roles schemas and permissions sets; I PrmsAssignment relat-
ing spatial roles, thus role instances, to specific permissions. Func-
tion I PrmsAssignment∗ is then introduced to combine permis-
sions directly assigned to spatial roles with permissions inherited
from their role schema.
DEFINITION 9 (PERMISSIONS). Let RS be the set of role
schemas, RI the set of role instances, OPS the set of operations,
OBJ the set of objects. The set of permissions PRMS is defined
as PRMS = 2(OPS×OBS). We also define:
• SPAS : RS×PRMS, a many-to-many mapping permission-
to-spatial role schema assignment relation;
• S PrmsAssignment : RS → 2PRMS , the mapping of
spatial role schemas onto sets of permissions. Given a role
schema rs, S PrmsAssignment(rs) = {p ∈ PRMS| <
rs, p >∈ SPAS};
• SPAI : RI×PRMS, a many-to-many mapping permission-
to-spatial role instance assignment relation;
• I PrmsAssignment : RI → 2PRMS the mapping of spa-
tial role instances onto sets of permissions. Given a role in-
stance ri, I PrmsAssignment(ri) = {p ∈ PRMS| <
ri, p >∈ SPAI};
• I PrmsAssignment∗ : RI → 2PRMS such that given
a role instance ri, I PrmsAssignment∗(ri) = I Prms-
Assignment(ri)∪S PrmsAssignment(SchemaOf(ri))}.
Hence the permissions of a role are those assigned to its
schema plus those directly assigned to the instance.
4.3 Users
Spatial roles are assigned to users. The definition of the model
for this part is conceptually analogous to that in RBAC.
DEFINITION 10 (USERS). Let U be the set of users and RI
be the set of role instances. We define:
• SUA ⊆ U × RI , a many-to-many mapping user-to-spatial
role instance assignment relation;
• SR AssignedUser : RI → 2U , the mapping of spatial
role instances onto sets of users. Formally SR Assigned-
User(< r, e >∈ RI) = {u ∈ U |(u,< r, e >) ∈ SUA}.
4.4 Sessions
When a user logs in, a new session is activated and a number of
roles are selected to be included in the session role set. However,
for a session role to be enabled, the user should be logically located
within the space of the role extent. In order to compute the logical
position of a user playing a role r in a session, the location mapping
function defined in the schema of r is applied to the user real po-
sition, provided by the external environment. Hence, if the logical
position of the user is spatially contained in the extent of r, the role
is enabled.
DEFINITION 11 (SESSIONS). Let U be the set of users and
SES the set of sessions. We define:
• SessionUser : SES → U , the mapping from a session s
to the user of s;
• SessionRoles : SES → 2RI with SessionRoles(s) ⊆
{< r, e >∈ RI |(SessionUser(s),< r, e >) ∈ SUA}.
real position of the session user.
SessionRoles(s) corresponds to the roles that can be poten-
tially activated in session s. However, depending on the user po-
sition during that session, only a subset of such roles is enabled
and permissions granted. To determine enabled roles, containment
between logical user position and role extent has to be assessed.
Then, for each enabled role, the set of permissions assigned to the
corresponding role schema is determined.
DEFINITION 12 (ENABLED ROLES). Enabled session roles
are defined as the function:
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EnabledSessionRoles : SES × RPOS → 2RI such that
EnabledSessionRole(s, rp) = {< r, e >∈ RI | < r, e >∈
SessionRoles(s), lpos = SchemaOf(r).mloc(rp),
Contains(LocObj(e), LocObj(lpos)) = TRUE}.
Enabled roles are the basis for determining whether to grant or
reject an access request, i.e., for defining the authorization control
mechanism. An access request is a tuple 〈s, rp, p, o〉 stating that
the user of session s in position rp wants to perform operation p
on object o, thus 〈s, rp, p, o〉 ∈ SES ×RPOS ×OPS ×OBJ .
An access request can be satisfied at real position rp, if permission
(p, o) belongs to the set of permissions assigned to the roles that
are enabled in s when the session user is in position rp.
DEFINITION 13 (AUTHORIZATION CONTROL FUNCTION). An
access request is a tuple ar = 〈s, rp, p, o〉 ∈ SES × RPOS ×
OPS ×OBJ . ar can be satisfied at position rp if
(p, o) ∈
[
y∈EnabledSessionRoles(s,rp)
I PrmsAssignment∗(y).
5. HIERARCHIES IN GEO-RBAC
As Hierarchical RBAC adds to Flat RBAC the support for role
hierarchies [17], hierarchical GEO-RBAC (GEO-HRAC) adds to
GEO-RBAC the support to model hierarchies. According to [17],
the hierarchical level can be defined by introducing a partial order
 between roles such that ri  rj means that: (i) rj inherits all
permissions assigned to ri; (ii) users which have been assigned rj
have also assigned ri.
Moreover, since in GEO-RBAC we introduce the concept of en-
abled role, we also assume that (iii) if rj is enabled, and thus the
user can play that role in a session s, also ri results to be enabled
in s.
Since in GEO-RBAC permissions can be assigned both at the
schema and the instance level, two different hierarchies can be de-
fined as illustrated in Figure 2. At the schema level, the hierarchy
allows us to define a partial order s between role schemas. Such
a hierarchy is then inherited at the instance level.
At the schema level, similarly to HRBAC, the partial order is
defined according to the semantics of the considered application
domain. Given two role schemas rs1 and rs2 , if rs1 s rs2 then
rs2 inherits all the permissions of rs1 . We assume that such order-
ing can be defined only when containment holds between the extent
and the location types of the role schemas. For example, given the
schemas:
citizen =< Citizen,City, PointInCity,mPointInCity>
taxiDriver =< TaxiDriver,UrbanRoadNetwork,
PointOnRoad,mPointOnRoad>
Citizen s TaxiDriver means that taxi drivers have at least the
same permissions of citizens.
At the instance level, for how the model is defined, all the role
instances inherit the permissions assigned to their role schema and
thus also the permissions of the inherited roles. Therefore the role
instance TaxiDriver(MilanRoad) will also inherit the permis-
sions of both the taxi driver and the citizen role schema. Moreover,
if r1(g1) and r2(g2) are two instances of schemas r1 and r2 such
that r1 s r2 then r1(g1) i r2(g2) means that not only r2(g2)
inherits the permissions of the role schema of r1 but also the per-
missions that have been assigned specifically to the instance r1(g1).
Suppose the role instance Citizen(Milan) has been given a spe-
cific permission. Then Citizen(Milan) i TaxiDriver(Mi-
lanRoad) means that the taxi driver will also inherit the permis-
sions of the Milan citizen.
Another case to be considered is when the roles are instances of
the same role schema. Consider the instances TaxiDriver(Mi-
lanRoad) and TaxiDriver(RoadCentreMilan)with the geom-
etry ofRoadCentreMilan (describing only the roads in the down-
town of Milan) contained in MilanRoad (all roads in Milan).
Since we assume RoadCentreMilan to be contained in Milan-
Road, a taxi driver with spatial extent the centre of Milan neces-
sarily inherits all the permissions of the taxi driver with the larger
extent. In this case, we consider this hierarchy be implicitly de-
fined.
To summarize, GEO-HRBAC can be formally defined as fol-
lows.
DEFINITION 14 (GEO-HRBAC). GEO-HRBAC is defined
from GEO-RBAC by introducing a partial order between role sche-
mas and instances. We define the hierarchy at the schema level as
follows:
1. RHs ⊆ RS ×RS , a partial order over RS , denoted by s.
If rs1 s rs2 holds, we assume that rs2 .ext ⊆ft rs1 .ext,
and rs2 .loc ⊆ft rs1 .loc;
2. S AuthorizedPrms : RS → 2PRMS such that, given a
role schema rs, S AuthorizedPrms(rs) returns all per-
missions assigned to rs and to all its ancestors, i.e. S Au-
thorizedPrms(rs) = {p ∈ PRMS|r′s s rs, < r′s, p >∈
SPAS}.
We define the hierarchy at the instance level as follows:
1. RHi ⊆ RI × RI , a partial order over RI , denoted by
i. < r1, e1 >i< r2, e2 > holds if SchemaOf(<
r1, e1 >) s SchemaOf(< r2, e2 >) and LocObj(e2) ⊆
LocObj(e1).
2. I AuthorizedPrms : RI → 2PRMS such that, given a
role instance ri, I AuthorizedPrms(ri) returns all per-
missions assigned to ri and to all its ancestors, i.e., I Au-
thorizedPrms(ri) = {p ∈ PRMS|r′i i ri, p ∈ I Prms-
Assignment∗(ri′)}.
3. I AuthorizedUsers : RI → 2U such that, given a role
instance ri, I AuthorizedUsers(ri) returns all users as-
signed to ri and to all its descendants, i.e., I Authorized-
Users(ri) = {u ∈ U |ri i r′i, < u, r′i >∈ SUA}.
From the previous definition it follows that the ordering between
role schemas corresponds to the ordering of position granulari-
ties: the location becomes more precise as the role becomes more
specific while the extension gets smaller. That is like to say that
the more “powerful” roles are those operating on smaller regions.
Moreover, we note that the ordering between instances of the same
schema (i.e., spatial roles with the same name) is implicitly defined
by the containment relationship existing between their extents.
Based on the above definition, it is possible to show a num-
ber of properties of role hierarchies. Some of them derive from
the permission and user inheritance and coincide with properties
that hold also for HRBAC. However, based on the containment re-
lationship existing between spatial roles, a new property can be
stated concerning enabled roles. Assume that a role ri2 is enabled
in a session s and a real position rp and that ri1 i ri2 . Since
from the definition of i the spatial extent of ri2 is contained in
the spatial extent of ri1 , this means that also ri1 is enabled. In
our example, this means that if TaxiDriver(MilanRoad) i
TaxiDriver(RoadCentreMilan), when TaxiDriver(Road-
CentreMilan) is enabled in a certain position, also Taxi driv-
er(MilanRoad) is enabled. The proof of the following proposi-
tion trivially follows from Definition 14.
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Figure 2: Hierarchical GEO-RBAC
Basic objects
FT = {UrbanRoadNetwork,Accident, City,AreaInCity,Monument, PointOnRoad}
OBJ = {Ext(UrbanRoadNetwork), Ext(Accident),Ext(Monument)}
OPS = {GetTrafficInfo,Notify, F ind}
PRMS = {p1, p2, p3} with
(
p1 = (GetTrafficInfo,Ext(UrbanRoadNetwork))
p2 = (Notify, Ext(Accident))
p3 = (Find,Ext(Monument))
Schema
R = {Citizen, TaxiDriver,T ourist}
REXT FT = {City, UrbanRoadNetwork,AreaInCity}
LPOS FT = {PointOnRoad}
RS = {rs1 , rs2 , rs3} with
(
rs1 =< Citizen,City, PointOnRoad,mPointOnRoad >
rs2 =< TaxiDriver,UrbanRoadNetwork, PointOnRoad,mPointOnRoad >
rs3 =< Tourist,AreaInCity,PointOnRoad,mPointOnRoad >
Instances
REXT = {Milan, CentreMilan,RoadMilan}
RI = {Citizen(Milan), T axiDriver(RoadMilan), T ourist(CentreMilan}
Schema role hierachy
rs1 s rs2 rs1 s rs3
User assignment
U = {John, Paul}
SUA = {sua1 , sua2 , sua3 , sua4} with
8
>
<
>
:
sua1 = 〈John, Citizen(Milan)〉
sua2 = 〈Paul, Citizen(Milan)〉
sua3 = 〈John, TaxiDriver(RoadMilan)〉
sua4 = 〈Paul, T ourist(CentreMilan)〉
Permission assignment
S PrmsAssignement(rs1) = {p1} S PrmsAssignement(rs2) = {p1, p2} S PrmsAssignement(rs3) = {p1, p3}
Sessions
SES = {s1, s2} UserSession(s1) = {John} UserSession(s2) = {Paul}
EnabledRoles
EnabledSessionRoles(s1, loc1) = {TaxiDriver(RoadMilan), Citizen(Milan)} if mPointOnRoad(loc1) is in RoadMilan
EnabledSessionRoles(s2, loc2) = {Citizen(Milan)}, if mPointOnRoad(loc2) is not in the centre of Milan
Figure 3: An example of a GEO-RBAC application
PROPOSITION 1. Let rs1 ∈ RS , rs2 ∈ RS , Let ri1 ∈ RI , ri2 ∈
RI , such that SchemaOf(ri1) = rs1 and SchemaOf(ri2) =
rs2 . Suppose that rs1 s rs2 and ri1 i ri2 . The following
properties hold:
• S AuthorizedPrms(rs1) ⊆ S AuthorizedPrms(rs2);
• I AuthorizedPrms(ri1) ⊆ I AuthorizedPrms(ri2);
• I AuthorizedUsers(ri2) ⊆ I AuthorizedUsers(ri1);
• for all s ∈ SES, rp ∈ RPOS, ri2 ∈ EnabledSession-
Role(s, rp) implies that ri1 ∈ EnabledSessionRole(s, rp).
6. A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMPLE
To finally summarize the characteristics of the model, we discuss
an extended example. Consider the scenario introduced in Sec-
tion 1, concerning an information service providing traffic informa-
tion. Suppose that the considered feature types are {UrbanRoadNet-
work,Accident, City,AreaInCity,Monument, PointOnRoad,
RoadSegment} and suppose the considered objects correspond to
the extentions of feature types UrbanRoadNetwork, Accident,
Monument. Assume, moreover, that permissions are defined to
receive traffic information concerning roads (GetTrafficInfo
operation over UrbanRoadNetwork features), to be notified in
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case of accident (Notify operation overAccident features) and to
locate monuments (Find operation overMonument). In this sce-
nario, we consider the roles: Citizen, TaxiDriver and Tourist.
The role schema of, say, Citizen can be modelled as follows:
< Citizen, City, PointOnRoad,mPointOnRoad >, where
mPointOnRoad is a functions mapping real user positions inPoint-
OnRoad features. The schemas are hierarchically ordered in such
a way that taxi drivers and tourists are also citizens. The unique
permission assigned to citizens is for getting traffic information
on roads. This permission is thus inherited by taxi drivers, that
in addition can also be notified of accidents, and also by tourists,
that in addition are allowed to locate monuments in an area of the
city. We define the following role instances: Citizen(Milan),
TaxiDriver(RoadMilan) and Tourist(CentreMilan).
Now, consider two users, say John and Paul. John is a taxi
driver in Milan whereas Paul is a tourist visiting the centre of Mi-
lan. Suppose that John starts a session s1 in (real) position loc1
and Paul a session s2 in (real) position loc2. If thePointOnRoad
logically corresponding to loc1 is contained in RoadMilan, then
role TaxiDriver(RoadMilan) is enabled for John during ses-
sion s1, otherwise it is not. Similarly, if the PointOnRoad log-
ically corresponding to loc2 is contained in CentreMilan, role
Tourist(CentreMilan) is enabled for Paul during session s2.
Conversely the only enabled role for Paul, assuming that Paul is
anyway in Milan, is that of citizen.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented GEO-RBAC, an extension of
the RBAC model dealing with spatial and location-based informa-
tion. Unlike other proposals of spatially aware access control mod-
els, GEO-RBAC relies on the OGC spatial model [12] to model
(spatial) objects, user positions, and geographically bounded roles,
making the approach quite standard and flexible. Another impor-
tant characteristic of the model is the ability to deal with either
real positions, obtained from a given mobile terminal or a cellular
phone, and logical ones, possibly represented at different granular-
ities. By introducing the concept of role schema, the type of role
extents and logical positions can be customized, depending on the
function the role represents. Moreover, besides the concept of ac-
tive role, the concept of enabled role has also been introduced, in
order to determine the roles that are enabled in sessions based on
user positions. Finally, like RBAC, GEO-RBAC has then been ex-
tended with hierarchies that allow one role to inherit permissions
from its ancestor roles, users from its descendant roles, and roles
to be enabled when descendant roles are. Future work includes the
definition of constraints for the model. The idea is to extend the
RBAC constraints to deal with conflicting role extents and user po-
sitions. An additional issue concerns the XML-based representa-
tion of the access control model. The prospected approach is to
base the XML represention of the GEO-RBAC model on GML
(Geography Markup Language) [14] for all spatial aspects. We
also plan to extend the model for use in sensor-based applications
and pervasive computing environments. Finally, another important
topic to consider is the authenticity of location information.
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